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INTRODUCTION
The United States has not executed any person for committing a
crime that did not cause death since the Supreme Court reinstated
the death penalty in 1976.1 That may soon change, however, now that
Patrick Kennedy sits on death row in Louisiana for raping an eight-
year-old girl.2 Kennedy is the first person sentenced to death for a
non-homicide crime3 since Coker v. Georgia, in which the Supreme
Court held that the death penalty is a disproportionate, and therefore
unconstitutional, punishment for the crime of rape of an adult
woman. 4 While it is clear that Coker bars the use of the death penalty
for that particular offense, it otherwise leaves open the question of
which, if any, non-homicide crimes can constitutionally be punished
by death.
Today, most states that allow capital punishment5 permit it only
for crimes that result in death. 6 Yet several capital states, including
Louisiana, have statutes that authorize the death penalty for certain
1 SeeJeffrey Matura, Note, When Will it Stop? The Use of the Death Penalty for Non-homi-
cide Crimes, 24J. LEGIS. 249, 250 (1998); Adam Liptak, Child's Rape Brings Death Sentence, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2003, at A6.
2 See Transcript of Record at 6068-69, State v. Kennedy, 854 So. 2d 296 (La. 2003)
(No. 98-1425) [hereinafter Transcript of Record].
3 See id.
4 See 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
5 The thirty-eight capital states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
and Wyoming. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
2004, at 2 (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp04.pdf [hereinafter CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 2004].
6 The twenty-five states that permit capital punishment only for homicide crimes are
Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyo-
ming. Id.
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non-homicide offenses such as child rape. 7 In 1995, the Louisiana
state legislature enacted the statute under which Patrick Kennedy was
sentenced, making it a capital offense to rape a child under the age of
twelve.8 The Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently upheld the con-
stitutionality of this law, and, in so holding, recognized that its deci-
sion may influence other states to pass similar death penalty statutes
for non-homicide crimes. 9
Kennedy's case is pending on direct appeal to the Louisiana Su-
preme Court.'0 If that court upholds Kennedy's sentence, the U.S.
Supreme Court will likely review the case and pass on the statute's
constitutionality. 1 This possibility is particularly compelling in light
of two recent Supreme Court decisions that have significantly altered
the contours of U.S. capital law. First, in 2002, the Court held in At-
kins v. Virginia that executing mentally retarded defendants violates
the Constitution. 12 Then, in 2005, the Court held in Roper v. Simmons
that imposing the death penalty on defendants who were juveniles
when they committed their crimes is unconstitutional. 13 The Court's
methodology in deciding these cases had a different focus than its
prior jurisprudence regarding the constitutionality of capital statutes.
In both Roper and Atkins, the Court examined objective indicia of na-
tional consensus as evidenced by state laws' 4 and by jury practices, 15
analyzed whether the punishments were proportional to the classes of
crimes, 1 6 and looked to other nations' treatment of the issues.' 7
Thus, the possibility that, in deciding Kennedy's case, the Court may
now apply this new framework to determine the constitutionality of
7 See id. Of the thirteen states that authorize the death penalty for non-homicide
crimes, five states-Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, and Mississippi-authorize it
only for what are known as extraordinary crimes, such as treason or espionage. Id. The
remaining eight states-Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, and South Dakota-authorize it for non-extraordinary, non-homicide crimes,
such as child rape and aggravated kidnapping. 2006 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 326 (West); 2006
S.C. Acts 346; CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2004, supra note 5, at 2.
8 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (1997).
9 See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1069 (La. 1996).
10 See Transcript of Record, supra note 2.
11 When the Court last commented on Louisiana's capital child-rape statute in the
context of a pretrial facial challenge to its constitutionality, Justice John Paul Stevens took
the opportunity in his concurrence to the Court's denial of the writ of certiorari to empha-
size that the Court had denied review not because the constitutional challenge was without
merit, but instead because of ajurisdictional issue. See Bethley v. Louisana, 520 U.S. 1259,
1259 (1997).
12 See 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
13 See 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
14 See 543 U.S. at 609-11; 536 U.S. at 343-48.
15 See 543 U.S. at 569, 583; 536 U.S. at 323-24.
16 See 543 U.S. at 560-64; 536 U.S. at 311-13.
17 See 543 U.S. at 575-78; 536 U.S. at 318 n.21.
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capital child-rape statutes raises several new and compelling issues for
death penalty jurisprudence.
Moreover, the dramatic impact a determination of this issue
would create also makes the possibility of Supreme Court review in
Kennedy's case critical. Such a decision would have far-reaching im-
plications not only for capital child-rape statutes, but also for all other
capital non-homicide statutes, given the Supreme Court's characteri-
zation of rape as a crime second only to homicide in the harm that it
causes.18 As such, a Supreme Court determination that capital child-
rape statutes are unconstitutional would likely invalidate all capital
non-homicide statutes because finding another capital non-homicide
statute constitutional would require convincing the Court that the
crime in question is worse than rape.19 In light of Supreme Court
case law and commentary on the severity of rape, such a showing
would be an extremely difficult, if not insurmountable, task.20 On the
other hand, a decision finding the Louisiana statute constitutional
may encourage other states to pass capital statutes for child rape as
well as other non-homicide crimes. It could even lead to a challenge
of Coker.2 t
This Note analyzes the framework the Court used in Atkins and
Roper and examines how it may use this framework to resolve whether
capital child-rape statutes are constitutional. In particular, the Note
examines how international opinion may inform the analysis in light
of the increasing weight the Court afforded it in Atkins and Roper and
asserts that the Court's use of international opinion reflects a more
normative approach to deciding constitutionality in death penalty
cases. Part I describes the historical development and current state of
capital non-homicide statutes, including child-rape statutes, in the
United States and discusses how Patrick Kennedy's case is a landmark
one. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's use of the "evolving stan-
dards of decency" principle both in the past and recently in Atkins and
Roper as a vehicle for bringing international opinion into its analysis.
Part III applies the Roper-Atkins framework to capital child-rape stat-
utes and concludes that under the Court's new method of analysis,
capital child-rape statutes are clearly unconstitutional, and that if the
18 SeeCokerv. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("Short of homi-
cide, [rape] is the 'ultimate violation of self.'" (quoting U.S. DEP'T OFJUST., LAw ENFORCE-
MENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION REPORT, RAPE AND ITS VICtIMS: A REPORT FOR CITIZENS
HEALTH FACILITIES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 1 (1975))); see also David W. Schaaf,
Note, What if the Victim Is a Child? Examining the Constitutionality of Louisiana's Challenge to
Coker v. Georgia, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 347, 376 (noting that convincing the Court that a
non-homicide crime is worse than rape would be quite difficult "[gliven the severity Coker
has assigned to rape as compared to other crimes").
19 See Schaaf, supra note 18, at 376.
20 See id.
21 See id.
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Court continues to consider international opinion in its death penalty
jurisprudence (as seems likely), it will continue to limit the punish-
ment's application.
I
PUNISHING CHILD RAPE BY DEATH: THE CURRENT STATE OF
CAPITAL CHILD-RAPE STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Factual Backdrop: Capital Punishment for Child Rape in the
United States
Throughout U.S. history, the death penalty has been available
only for what are considered the most serious crimes. 22 The Supreme
Court's 1910 decision in Weems v. United States, holding that the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Clause requires that punishment
for a crime be proportional to its severity, compels this limited appli-
cation. 23 Though the Court in Weems changed the constitutionality
analysis by introducing this proportionality consideration, it offered
little additional guidance as to which crimes are actually proportional
to the punishment of death. While the Weems standard could be read
to bar capital punishment for any offense that does not result in
death, states continued to apply the death penalty to both homicide
and non-homicide crimes in the decades following the decision, al-
though the vast majority of executions were still for homicide
crimes. 24
Then, in 1977, the Court provided more guidance regarding the
proportionality analysis when it held in Coker v. Georgia that the death
penalty is a disproportionate, and therefore unconstitutional, punish-
ment for the crime of "rape of an adult woman."25 This decision revo-
lutionized death penalty jurisprudence: Although the Court in Coker
did not explicitly hold the death penalty unconstitutional for all
crimes not involving killings, 26 many observers have read the decision
to mean just that, since the Court based its holding largely on the
22 See, e.g., FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 18 (2003).
23 See 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plural-
ity opinion) (finding that a punishment that is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of
the crime" is unconstitutionally excessive).
24 See Matura, supra note 1, at 251 ("[Bletween 1930 and 1982, 3340 people were
executed for murder, 455 were executed for rape, and 70 were executed for crimes such as
armed robbery, espionage, kidnapping and burglary.").
25 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
26 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 600 (plurality opinion) ("[I]n Georgia a person commits mur-
der when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes
the death of another human being. He also commits that crime when in the commission
of a felony he causes the death of another human being, irrespective of malice. But even
where the killing is deliberate, it is not punishable by death absent proof of aggravating
circumstances. It is difficult to accept the notion, and we do not, that the rapist, with or
2006]
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distinction between crimes that cause death and crimes that do not.2 7
The Court reasoned that because the crime of rape does not result in
death, punishing rape by death would be unconstitutionally
excessive. 28
The Court then reinforced this same type of proportionality anal-
ysis in Enmund v. Florida by applying its reasoning from Coker to hold
that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for the crime
of felony robbery because felony robbery, like rape, "'does not com-
pare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human
life.'1 29 The Court went on to state that "[a] s was said of the crime of
rape in Coker, we have the abiding conviction that the death penalty,
which is 'unique in its severity and irrevocability,' is an excessive pen-
alty for the robber who, as such, does not take human life." 30 Thus,
the Court seemed to say that in order for a crime to be proportional
to the punishment of death, it must cause death.31
The Georgia statute that the Court invalidated in Coker was the
only statute in the United States at the time that authorized the death
penalty for rape of an adult woman.3 2 After Coker, other state legisla-
without aggravating circumstances, should be punished more heavily than the deliberate
killer as long as the rapist does not himself take the life of his victim.").
27 See, e.g., Annaliese Flynn Fleming, Comment, Louisiana's Newest Capital Crime: The
Death Penalty for Child Rape, 89J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 727 (1999).
28 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 598 (plurality opinion) ("Rape is without doubt deserving of
serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to
the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of
human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does
not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills;
the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is
not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is
unique in its severity and irrevocability,' is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such,
does not take human life." (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion) (citation
omitted)); see also Fleming, supra note 27, at 727 (discussing the line drawn by the Coker
Court between "crimes which result in loss of life, and crimes which do not").
29 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 598).
30 Id. at 797 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187) (citation omitted).
31 But see Bridgette M. Palmer, Note, Death as a Proportionate Penalty for the Rape of a
Child: Considering One State's Current Law, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 843, 846 n.32 (1999) (point-
ing out that although the Court did not specifically mention it in its decision, race was also
a major factor in Coker since the death penalty for rape was applied almost exclusively to
black men who had raped white women).
32 Coker, 433 U.S. at 595-96 (plurality opinion). At the time of Coker, two other states
had statutes authorizing the death penalty for rape of a child, but each of these statutes was
later invalidated. See id. at 595 (plurality opinion). The Florida Supreme Court deemed its
state's statute unconstitutional under Coker. See Bufurd v. State, 403 So. 2d 943, 951 (Fla.
1981), cited in Yale Glazer, Child Rapists Beware! The Death Penalty and Louisiana's Amended
Aggravated Rape Statute, 25 AM.J. CRIM. L. 79, 81 n.2 (1997). In invalidating the Mississippi
statute, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that it did not need to reach the question of
whether the statute was constitutional, because imposing the death penalty for child rape
violates Mississippi state law. See Leatherwood v. State, 548 So. 2d 389, 403 (Miss. 1989),
cited in Glazer, supra, at 81 n.2. While Tennessee also had a statute authorizing capital
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tures were reticent to pass statutes authorizing the death penalty for
any non-homicide crime, as these legislatures believed such statutes
would be invalid under Cokersince, under one reading of the case, the
death penalty is unconstitutional not only for rape but for all other
non-homicide crimes as well.3 3 Indeed, after Coker, not a single state
passed a statute allowing capital punishment for any form of rape un-
til 1995 when Louisiana passed its child-rape statute34-the one under
which Patrick Kennedy was eventually sentenced to death.
Of the thirty-eight states that currently allow capital punish-
ment,35 only thirteen allow capital punishment for crimes other than
homicide, 36 and only five of those thirteen-Florida, Louisiana, Mon-
tana, Oklahoma, and South Carolina-authorize the death penalty for
child rape.37 Yet no state has executed a person under a capital non-
homicide statute since before Coker. In fact, the last execution for a
crime not resulting in death was in 1964-38-before the Supreme
Court suspended the use of the death penalty in 1972. 39 Thus, the
question of whether all such non-homicide statutes, including the cap-
ital child-rape statutes, are constitutional remains unanswered and
particularly compelling in light of the fact that they are all arguably
unconstitutional under Coker.40
B. Louisiana's Capital Child-Rape Statute and Patrick Kennedy:
The First Person Sentenced to Death for a Non-
homicide Crime Since Before Coker v. Georgia
All that may soon change, however, since ajury sentenced Patrick
Kennedy to death for child rape in October 2003.41 Although Louisi-
ana prosecutors in the past had sought the death penalty against other
defendants under the child-rape statute, they had not succeeded in
punishment for child rape, its supreme court had already held the statute unconstitutional
by the time of Coker because it made the death penalty mandatory for the crime. See Col-
lins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1977), cited in Coker, 433 U.S. at 595 (plurality
opinion).
-33 See Fleming, supra note 27, at 727; Matura, supra note 1, at 255.
34 See Schaaf, supra note 18, at 350.
35 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2004, supra note 5, at 2. Five of those thirty-eight states, how-
ever, could be considered de facto abolitionist, as they have not imposed the death penalty
since the Supreme Court reinstated it in 1976. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2006), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.
pdf.
36 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2004, supra note 5, at 2; Melissa Meister, Note, MurderingInno-
cence: The Constitutionality of Capital Child Rape Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 210-12 (2003).
37 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (1997); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (2005); 2006 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 326 (West); 2006 S.C. Acts 346.
38 See Matura, supra note 1, at 250; Liptak, supra note 1.
39 See Michael P. Seng, Reflections on When "We, the People" Kill, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
713, 715 (2001).
40 See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1074 (La. 1996) (Calogero, C.J., dissenting).
41 See Transcript of Record, supra note 2, at 6068-69.
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getting a jury to return a death sentence until Kennedy. 42 Thus, for
the first time since Coker, Kennedy's sentencing has brought to the
fore an important question for death penalty jurisprudence, namely
whether it is constitutional to punish non-homicide crimes, like child
rape, by death.
Kennedy's case is pending on direct appeal in the Louisiana Su-
preme Court.43 That court has already held the state's capital child-
rape statute constitutional when the defendants in the consolidated
cases of State v. Wilson raised a pretrial facial challenge to the statute's
constitutionality. 44 In Wilson, the state charged and indicted the de-
fendants under the statute for raping girls under the age of twelve. 45
Each defendant then brought a motion to quash the capital indict-
ment.46 In the lower Louisiana courts, each defendant won the mo-
tion to quash-one defendant on excessive punishment grounds and
the other on "arbitrary and capricious" grounds.47 Yet when the case
reached the Louisiana Supreme Court on appeal, that court reversed
the lower courts' rulings and held that the capital child-rape statute
was constitutional. 48 One of the defendants applied for a writ of certi-
orari, but the Supreme Court denied it on jurisdictional grounds, as
no final judgment had yet been reached.49 Ultimately, State v. Wilson
ended in plea bargains for life sentences, and any possibility of Su-
preme Court review of the statute's constitutionality stopped there. 50
Because the Louisiana Supreme Court recently found the statute
constitutional in Wilson,51 it may simply follow its own precedent in
Kennedy's case. On the other hand, it may overturn Kennedy's sen-
tence due to a trial error or, alternatively, a change in position-
namely that because the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Wilson
before Atkins and Roper came down from the U.S. Supreme Court, it
may now find differently on the issue of the statute's constitutionality.
If the court upholds the statute, the U.S. Supreme Court may
take advantage of the opportunity to review the Louisiana Supreme
Court's decision, since Kennedy, being the first person sentenced to
42 See Liptak, supra note 1.
43 See Transcript of Record, supra note 2.
44 See 685 So. 2d, at 1073.
45 Id. at 1064-65.
46 Id.
47 See Schaaf, supra note 18, at 351.
48 See Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1073.
49 See Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259, 1259 (1997). Although it was unnecessary
for them to do so, Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer
issued a statement in which they emphasized that the Court denied certiorari solely on the
basis of the finality doctrine. See id. Perhaps this unnecessary explanation of the jurisdic-
tional bar indicated that they believed that the constitutional attack did in fact have merit.
50 See Liptak, supra note 1.
51 See Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1073.
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death for committing a non-homicide crime since Coker, raises an is-
sue that legislatures, 52 courts, 53 and commentators 54 alike have de-
bated for nearly thirty years-whether it is constitutional to execute a
person for committing a crime that does not cause death, such as
child rape. A determination by the U.S. Supreme Court of the Louisi-
ana statute's constitutionality has the potential to open or close the
door not only to capital child-rape statutes, but to all other non-homi-
cide capital statutes as well.
Even if the Supreme Court does not review Kennedy's case, the
issue of whether imposing the death penalty for non-homicide crimes
is unconstitutionally excessive remains. The Court will inevitably re-
view this issue at some point to resolve the heated debate surrounding
these laws.
II
ATKINS AND ROPER-THE NEW FRAMEWORK: NATIONAi
CONSENSUS, PROPORTIONALrrY, AND (AGAIN)
INTERNATIONAL OPINION
Although in the past the Supreme Court had looked to interna-
tional opinion in death penalty cases, 55 its death penalty jurispru-
dence immediately prior to Atkins v. Virginia56 and Roper v. Simmons57
had stopped considering international opinion altogether, 58 making it
appear that the Court had grown to agree with Justice Scalia and those
52 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-
1201 (West 2006).
53 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-75 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 312-13 (2002).
54 See Lisa White Shirley, State v. Wilson: The Louisiana Supreme Court Sanctions the
Death Penalty for Child Rape, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1913 (1998); Meryl P. Diamond, Note, Assessing
the Constitutionality of Capital Child Rape Statutes, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1159 (1999); Fleming,
supra note 27; Meister, supra note 36; Palmer, supra note 31; Pallie Zambrano, Comment,
The Death Penalty Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment for the Crime of Rape-Even the Rape of a
Child, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1267 (1999).
55 See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (plurality opinion)
("We have previously recognized the relevance of the views of the international community
in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual."); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 796-97 (1982) ("[T]he doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in England and
India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and
is unknown in continental Europe."); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality
opinion) ("It is... not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in
1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue."); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958) (plurality opinion) (finding that the punishment in
question was disproportionate to the crime in part because "[t]he civilized nations of the
world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for
crime").
56 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
57 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
58 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 n.1 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 331 (1989).
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commentators who believe it entirely inappropriate to consider inter-
national law when interpreting the U.S. Constitution. 59 As Justice
Antonin Scalia asserted, "[T]he views of other nations, however en-
lightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be
imposed upon Americans through the Constitution. ''60
It is clear from Atkins and Roper, however, that the Court is now
considering international opinion more than ever before. 61 In Atkins,
the Court asserted the relevance of international opinion to its appli-
cation of the Eighth Amendment 62 and then expanded greatly upon
that idea in Roper 63 In fact, Roper was the first Eighth Amendment
case to devote an entire section of the opinion to international treat-
ment of the topic under review.64 Thus, though it may be only one
factor in the Court's analysis, international opinion could have dra-
matic implications for the future of death penalty jurisprudence.
A. Evolving Standards of Decency Determine What Is Cruel and
Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment, which is applicable both to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment and to the federal government,
bars the use of "excessive sanctions" in the criminaijustice system.65 It
states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. '66 Underlying
this provision is the fundamental "precept ofjustice that punishment
for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] of-
fense."67 The Court uses this proportionality standard to determine
which punishments are unconstitutionally excessive.
The Court rejects the idea that only those punishments that
would have been deemed cruel and unusual at the time the Eighth
Amendment was adopted are prohibited; rather, the Court holds that
the appropriate inquiry considers contemporary norms. 68 In Weems,
the Court explained that the cruel and unusual punishment clause is
59 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 859-78 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 Am. J. Irr'L L.
57 (2004); Lawrence Connell, The Supreme Court, Foreign Law, and Constitutional Governance,
11 WIDENER L. REv. 59, 73 (2004).
60 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4.
61 See Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International Equipoise,
53 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8 (2005).
62 See 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
63 See 543 U.S. 551, 575-79 (2005).
64 See Alford, supra note 61, at 8.
65 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
66 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
67 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910), quoted in Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
68 See id. at 378.
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"progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane jus-
tice."69 As such, in determining what is constitutional under the
Eighth Amendment, the Court looks to "evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 70
The "evolving standards of decency" principle is a flexible and
dynamic rule of construction 7' intended to evolve with societal norms
as they develop so that the Court may reflect these norms in its consti-
tutionality review.72 This principle is now the primary framework
within which the Court reviews constitutional claims challenging the
application of the death penalty,73 and the Court's commitment to it
has grown even stronger in recent cases.74
The main indicator of evolving standards of decency is objective
indicia of a national consensus on what constitutes a proportional
punishment for a particular offense. The Court has found that the
best evidence of such norms is the legislation of the federal and state
legislatures. 75 In addition to objective indicia of national consensus,
the Court has also used jury practice as an important point of refer-
ence 76 and has even on occasion considered public opinion surveys
and the views of professional organizations. 77 The Court has also
looked to international opinion to determine evolving standards of
69 Id.
70 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion).
71 See Brian W. Varland, Marking the Progress of a Maturing Society: Reconsidering the Con-
stitutionality of Death Penalty Application in Light of Evolving Standards of Decency, 28 HAMUNE
L. REV. 311, 334 (2005).
72 See Shirley, supra note 54, at 1915 ("The view that the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause adapts to a changing society is now a central component of the Court's pro-
portionality review.").
73 SeeVarland, supra note 71, at 317 ("The Trop plurality's novel 'evolving standards of
decency' principle would eventually become an accepted framework employed in several
major death penalty decisions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.").
74 See id. at 332 ("In recent decades, the Court's Eighth Amendment decisions have
shown a continued commitment to an 'evolving standards of decency' jurisprudence ....
This commitment expanded in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, where the Court
signaled that it would reconsider past decisions to determine whether their holdings still
squared with the Eighth Amendment's dynamic meaning.").
75 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) ("The clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's
legislatures.").
76 See id. (stating that the Court has "looked to data concerning the actions of sen-
tencing juries"); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794 (1982) ("Society's rejection of the
death penalty for accomplice liability in felony murders is also indicated by the sentencing
decisions that juries have made. As we have previously observed, 'The jury ... is a signifi-
cant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly in-
volved.'" (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality opinion))).
77 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he
American Bar Association and the American Law Institute have formally expressed their
opposition to the death penalty for juveniles.").
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decency when interpreting the Eighth Amendment,78 and Roper and
Atkins reflect the increased importance of this consideration to the
Court's analysis. 79 As one commentator observed, "[1]n Roper v. Sim-
mons, the Court unequivocally affirms the use of comparative constitu-
tionalism to interpret the Eighth Amendment."80
B. Consideration of International Opinion Under the Roper-
Atkins "Evolving Standards of Decency" Framework
Considering international opinion in the Court's analysis has im-
portant implications. Though it is just one factor, it is an important
one given that its continued expansion in Roper and Atkins signals a
new trend in the Court's methodology for determining the constitu-
tionality of imposing the death penalty for a particular offense. 81 For
the first time in an Eighth Amendment case, the Court in Roper de-
voted an entire section of the decision to a discussion of international
opinion and even went so far as to give an explanation regarding how
it is a relevant consideration.8 2
This consideration of international opinion reflects the global
view underlying the Court's death penalty jurisprudence, and since
the United States uses the death penalty much more extensively than
the majority of nations, 83 this view could lead to a limitation of the
punishment in the United States. Moreover, the Court's bold state-
ments regarding how international opinion is relevant to Eighth
Amendment interpretation in Roper suggest that the Court may con-
sider the international perspective in other facets of its constitutional
jurisprudence. 84
78 See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788-89; Brief for Former U.S. Diplomats Morton
Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 26-28, Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Abramowitz Brief]. The Framers intended
that the Court should consider international norms, along with national considerations, in
interpreting the Eighth Amendment. As Justice Harry Blackmun noted, "The drafters of
the [Eighth] Amendment were concerned, at root, with the 'dignity of man,' and under-
stood that 'evolving standards of decency' should be measured, in part, against interna-
tional norms." Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J.
39, 45-46 (1994) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
79 See Alford, supra note 59; Connell, supra note 59, at 59.
80 Alford, supra note 61, at 1.
81 See Alford, supra note 59; Connell, supra note 59.
82 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-79; Afford, supra note 61, at 8. For a discussion of why
the Court found international opinion relevant, see infra Part II.C.3.
83 Ninety-eight countries and territories retain the death penalty. AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL, FACTS AND FIGURES ON THE DEATH PENALTY (2005), http://web.amnesty.org/web/
web.nsf/print/0F97867C9B88D6C88025704c003AFF41. Thirty of these countries are abo-
litionist in practice, however, in that they have not used the death penalty in over ten years.
See id. Only a small number of the remaining sixty-eight retentionist countries use the
punishment each year. See id. In 2005, 94% of all recorded executions took place in one
of four countries: China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. See id.
84 See Alford, supra note 61, at 22.
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According to many commentators, the intent of the founders of
the Constitution warrants the focus on international opinion. 85 As
Human Rights Watch and Human Rights Advocates stated as amici
curiae in Roper v. Simmons, "To view the evolving standard of decency
in an isolated and insular domestic environment would be contrary to
all that the drafters of the Constitution knew as essential to joining the
ranks of nations. '86 Justice Blackmun himself asserted that the foun-
ders intended the Eighth Amendment to uphold the "'dignity of the
man,"' and that as a result, evolving standards of decency must neces-
sarily consider international norms. 87
Many commentators argue that prior Eighth Amendment cases
also warrant consideration of international opinion.88 One commen-
tator, Harold Koh, argues that U.S. courts have historically considered
international opinion when interpreting U.S. law and should thus
continue to do so today.89 He further asserts that the Court routinely
looks to international opinion in three situations.90 One such situa-
tion arises when the language of a constitutional provision "implicitly
refers to a community standard."9 1 For example, Koh asserts that the
words "cruel and unusual" implicitly invoke a consideration of inter-
85 See Abramowitz Brief, supra note 78, at 27; Brief for Human Rights Committee of
the Bar of England and Wales, Human Rights Advocates, Human Rights Watch, and the
World Organization for Human Rights USA as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
3-8, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Human Rights
Brief]; Brief of President James Earl Carter Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Carter Brief]; Alford, supra note 61;
Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (2004);
Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 Am. J.
INT'L L. 82 (2004); Carly Baetz-Stangel, Note, The Role of International Law in the Abolition of
the Juvenile Death Penalty in the United States, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 955 (2004). But see Connell,
supra note 59, at 61 ("[T] he majority's reliance on European law in [Atkins and Lawrence v.
Texas], to justify its interpretation of the United States Constitution, improperly interferes
in matters that historically have been left to state legislatures, thereby undermining both
principles of federalism and American sovereignty.").
86 Human Rights Brief, supra note 85, at 7.
87 See Blackmun, supra note 78, at 45-46 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100
(1958) (plurality opinion)).
88 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and
Foreign Sources of Law, 47 Wr. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005), Sarah H. Cleveland, Our Interna-
tional Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2006); Josh Hsu, Looking Beyond the Boundaries:
Incorporating International Norms into the Supreme Court's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 36 N.M.
L. REv. 75 (2006).
89 See Koh, supra note 85, at 44.
90 See id. at 45 ("History suggests that over the years, the Court has regularly looked to
foreign and international precedents as an aid to constitutional interpretation in at least
three situations, which for simplicity's sake I will call 'parallel rules,' 'empirical light,' and
community standard."').
91 Id. at 46 ("[T]he Court has looked outside the United States when a U.S. constitu-
tional concept, by its own terms, implicitly refers to a community standard-e.g., 'cruel and
unusual' 'due process of law,' 'unreasonable searches and seizures.' In such cases, the Court
has long since recognized that the relevant communities to be consulted include those
outside our shores.").
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national norms, and, as such, the Court has-and should-consider
international opinion when interpreting the Eighth Amendment. 92
Koh also argues that the Court in Trop v. Duies adopted the "evolving
standards of decency" framework intending that the inquiry should
reach international as well as domestic norms as is demonstrated by
the fact that it has applied the standard as such.9 3
Beginning in 1958 with Trop, the Court began explicitly consider-
ing international opinion in its Eighth Amendment cases. 94 In Trap,
the Court noted that "[t] he civilized nations of the world are in virtual
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for
crime," thus clearly incorporating international norms into its "evolv-
ing standards of decency" analysis. 95 In 1972, the Coker Court stated
that "[i] t is ... not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the
world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape
where death did not ensue."9 6 In 1982, the Court continued the
trend through Enmund v. Florida by finding it telling that "the doctrine
of felony murder has been abolished in England and India, severely
restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth coun-
tries, and is unknown in continental Europe. '9 7 Finally, in 1988, the
Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma, in looking back on its prior use of
international opinion when considering the constitutionality of the ju-
venile death penalty, stated, "We have previously recognized the rele-
vance of the views of the international community in determining
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual."98 The court also cited
the opposition to the practice "by other nations that share our Anglo-
American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western Euro-
pean community" as relevant.9 9
Two years after Thompson, however, in a drastic and largely unex-
plained departure from its precedent of considering international
opinion, the Court in the five-to-four decision of Stanford v. Kentucky
explicitly rejected the idea that international opinion was informa-
92 See id. at 46 ("For example, in deciding whether a particular punishment has be-
come both 'cruel and unusual,' the Court has long taken notice of foreign and interna-
tional practice to evaluate how 'unusual' the practice has become.").
93 See id. at 46-47 ("In Trop v. Dulles, the Court specifically held that the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution contains 'evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.' In Trop and subsequent cases, the Court made
clear that this 'evolving standard' should be measured by reference not just to maturing
American experience, but to foreign and international experience as well." (quoting Trop,
356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion))).
94 See 356 U.S. at 86.
95 Id. at 102.
96 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (plurality opinion).
97 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982).
98 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.31 (1988) (plurality opinion).
99 Id. at 830 (plurality opinion).
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tive.' 00 The majority stated that while international norms might be
relevant to determine "'whether a practice uniform among our peo-
ple is not merely a historical accident' . . . they cannot serve to estab-
lish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is
accepted among our people."" A strong dissent took issue with the
majority's decision to eschew international norms, stating that inter-
national opinion had been and should continue to be an important
consideration. 0 2 In Penry v. Lynaugh, handed down the same day as
Stanford, the Court altogether ignored the idea that international
opinion could be or had ever been relevant, and instead mentioned
only the United States in its examination of evolving standards of de-
cency.10 3 In the wake of Stanford and Penry, the question of whether
international opinion would prevail as a consideration loomed. But
then in Roper and Atkins, the Court gave international opinion re-
newed force, quelling any doubts over the factor's importance to the
"evolving standards of decency" analysis.' 0 4
Commentators also argue that given the general trend toward
considering international opinion in the Court's constitutional con-
struction, the Court should likewise do so when interpreting the
Eighth Amendment. 10 5 For example, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Su-
preme Court assessed whether certain practices are considered "an
integral part of human freedom in many other countries."1 0 6 Addi-
tionally, the Court in Washington v. Glucksberg looked to the opinions
of Western Europe to inform its determination of whether physician-
assisted suicide violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 0 7
The Court has performed similar analyses in cases regarding other
constitutional doctrines.10 8
100 See 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
101 Id. at 370 n.1 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
102 See id. at 388-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Our cases recognize that objective in-
dicators of contemporary standards of decency in the form of legislation in other countries
is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis .... Within the world community, the
imposition of the death penalty for juvenile crimes appears to be overwhelmingly
disapproved.").
1o See 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
104 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 318 n.21 (2002).
105 See, e.g., Abramowitz Brief, supra note 78, at 28 ("International opinion has in-
formed this Court's recent understandings of other constitutional doctrines as well.");
Human Rights Brief, supra note 85, at 22 ("Consistent with the approach of the Founders,
on a number of occasions and with increasing frequency, this Court has recognized the
permissibility of practices in this country."); Neuman, supra note 85, at 84.
106 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003).
107 See 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (noting that "almost every western democracy" op-
poses physician-assisted suicide).
108 See, e.g., Grtter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring);
Raines v. Burd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997); Neuman, supra note 85, at 84.
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C. The Roper-Atkins "Evolving Standards of Decency" Framework:
A Closer Look
In Atkins and Roper, the Court used a three-part analysis to deter-
mine whether, under evolving standards of decency, imposing the
death penalty would have been so disproportionate as to be "cruel
and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment. In both cases, the Court
first looked for a national consensus as evidenced by the acts of state
legislatures. The Court then assessed the proportionality of the pun-
ishment to the relevant crimes, considering whether the death penalty
was being limited, as required, to the most serious classes of crimes
and offenders, and whether its application would serve the goals of
retribution and deterrence. Lastly, the Court looked to international
opinion to inform its analysis.
1. National Indicia of Consensus
The Court in Atkins departed from the strict "counting" method-
ology that it had used in prior death penalty cases. Under the old
counting approach, a sheer majority of states determined whether
there was a national consensus on an issue.109 In Atkins, however,
even though fewer than half of the states were against imposing the
death penalty on the mentally retarded, i t0 the Court found that a na-
tional consensus disfavored the practice. 11' AsJustice Scalia noted in
his dissent, a minority of states is insufficient to constitute a consensus
not only by definition,"t 2 but also under the Court's prior case law.' 13
The majority justified its departure from the old counting standard by
stating that " [i]t is not so much the number of these States that is
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change."' 14 Particu-
larly in light of itsjustification, this departure reflects that the Court-
even if it does not admit it-now weighs other factors more heavily
than ever before in its death penalty jurisprudence, and, significantly,
more heavily than counting." 5
In Roper, the Court followed the modified counting methodology
of Atkins and examined legislation and jury practice to find a national
109 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-72 (1989).
110 See 536 U.S. 304, 342 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
III See id. at 321 (majority opinion).
112 See id. at 342-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113 See id. at 343. Although in Atkins, the Court found 47% of capital states sufficient to
establish a national consensus against executing the mentally retarded, id. at 321 (majority
opinion), thirteen years earlier, in Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court found 42% of states insuf-
ficient to establish a consensus, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); accord S. Starling Marshall, Comment,
"Predictive Justice"? Simmons v. Roper and the Possible End of the Juvenile Death Penalty, 72
FORDHAM L. REv. 2889, 2920 (2004).
114 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
115 See Marshall, supra note 113, at 2921.
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consensus against imposing the death penalty on juveniles.' 1' Here,
again, the traditional counting method would not have yielded a con-
sensus result, as the sheer numbers were identical to those in Atkins.' 17
To justify finding consensus, the Court relied on the Atkins "direction
of change" reasoning, even though the "direction of change" evidence
was weaker than in Atkins due to a slower rate of abolition.'"8  The
Court explained its "direction of change" reasoning through two
points: First, no state that had previously prohibited the juvenile death
penalty reinstated it after the Court affirmed its constitutionality in
Stanford (overturned by Roper), and second, the trend toward abolish-
ing the juvenile death penalty compensated for its slow rate." 9 Fur-
thermore, the Court noted that in states that authorized the juvenile
death penalty, juries rarely used it.120 The Court further explained
that the slower abolition rate simply illustrated that the consensus
against the juvenile death penalty was larger to begin with than that
against the death penalty for the mentally retarded.12 !
2. Proportionality Analysis
In both Atkins and Roper, the Court then considered the culpabil-
ity of the defendants relative to the severity of the death penalty. 22
Quoting the Atkins opinion, the Roper Court stated, "Capital punish-
ment must be limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow cate-
gory of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes
them 'the most deserving of execution." ' 23 Based on this precept,
the Roper Court, for example, concluded that juveniles cannot be
116 See 543 U.S. 551, 563-68 (2005).
117 See id. The court stated:
When Atkins was decided, 30 States prohibited the death penalty for the
mentally retarded. This number comprised 12 that had abandoned the
death penalty altogether, and 18 that maintained it but excluded the men-
tally retarded from its reach. By a similar calculation in this case, 30 States
prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising 12 that have rejected the
death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, by express provision
or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach.
Id. at 564 (citation omitted).
118 See id. at 563-68.
119 See id. at 565-67.
120 See id. at 563-65 ("[E]ven in the 20 states without a formal prohibition on execut-
ing juveniles, the practice is infrequent. Since Stanford, six States have executed prisoners
for crimes committed asjuveniles. In the past 10 years, only three have done so .
121 See id. at 565-67.
122 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 567-72; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317-19 (2002). Al-
though the Court examined relative culpability in both Atkins and Roper, it did so in a
slightly different fashion in each case. The Atkins Court considered whether executing the
mentally retarded limits the death penalty to only the worst offenders in the context of its
discussion of retribution. See 536 U.S. at 317-19. In Roper, however, the Court isolated
relative culpability and discussed it separately-although still as part of its proportionality
analysis-before examining retribution and deterrence. See 543 U.S. at 568-71.
123 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
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"among the worst offenders" because certain characteristics they typi-
cally possess-such as lack of maturity, vulnerability to external pres-
sures, and underdeveloped character-make them incapable of
belonging to that narrow class. 124
As part of the proportionality analysis, the Court in both Atkins
and Roper also inquired into whether imposing the death penalty on
the defendants would serve the goals of retribution and deterrence. 125
In conducting this inquiry, the Roper Court concluded that executing
juveniles would not serve the retribution goal because imposing the
most severe penalty on defendants with the diminished relative culpa-
bility would be disproportionate.126 The Roper Court also found that
the death penalty would not have achieved the deterrence goal since
no evidence showed that the punishment had any deterrent effect on
juveniles. 127
3. International Opinion
a. International Opinion in the Roper-Atkins "Evolving
Standards of Decency" Framework
Lastly, in both Atkins and Roper, the Court used international
opinion to bolster its conclusions regarding the constitutionality of
the death penalty. First, in Atkins, the Court made a great leap by
reintroducing international opinion into its analysis after having ex-
plicitly rejected the idea that it was a relevant consideration in Stanford
and Penry.128 The Court did so in a single, powerful footnote follow-
ing its statement that there is a national consensus against the practice
of executing the mentally retarded. 129 The footnote cites a brief filed
by the European Union for the proposition that "[a]dditional evi-
dence makes it clear that this legislative judgment reflects a much
broader social and professional consensus .... [W]ithin the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed
by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved." 130
The Roper Court then vastly expanded this type of analysis by, for
the first time in any Eighth Amendment case, devoting an entire sec-
tion of its opinion to a discussion of how international opinion bears
124 Id. at 569.
125 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571-72; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-21.
126 See 543 U.S. at 571.
127 See id. at 571-72.
128 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) ("We emphasize that it is American conceptions of
decency that are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various
amici... that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant."); 492 U.S. 302, 331
(1989) (mentioning only the United States in its examination of "evolving standards of
decency").
129 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
130 Id.
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on the issue.13' This treatment forcefully affirmed the pertinence of
international opinion to Eighth Amendment interpretation. 32 The
Court began the discussion with the sweeping statement that its invali-
dation of the juvenile death penalty was supported by the "stark reality
that the United States [wa]s the only country in the world that con-
tinue[d] to give [it] official sanction."'133 The Court went on to say
that it had in past cases referred (albeit not dispositively) "to the laws
of other countries and to international authorities as instructive"
when interpreting the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause. 134 Af-
ter detailing its past Eighth Amendment decisions that considered in-
ternational opinion, 35 the Court then cited an overwhelming
uniformity of state practice, international covenants, and the United
Kingdom's recent death penalty jurisprudence as instructive.13 6
The Roper Court went on to state that international opinion pro-
vides "respected and significant confirmation for [the Court's] own
conclusions."' 37 The opinion ended with a strong statement that both
justified the Court's use of international opinion and provided insight
into its underlying rationale for using it: "It does not lessen our fidelity
to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the
express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations
and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights
within our own heritage of freedom."'138
The implications here are dramatic. The Roper Court went be-
yond what any prior Eighth Amendment case that had examined in-
ternational opinion had done. Though the Court characterized its
use of international opinion as providing "confirmation" for its own
conclusions, 39 its use clearly went further than prior cases' concep-
tion of "confirmation." One commentator summed up the difference
well:
In the past, the Court has suggested that foreign practice might be
useful as an additional indicator of what ordered societies require,
but rarely has it given any real credence to foreign practices. Roper
is significant in that it elevates foreign practice to a confirmatory
role of what human decency requires.140
131 See Alford, supra note 61, at 8.
132 See id. at 1.
133 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
134 Id.
135 See id. at 575-78 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Geor-
gia, 433 U.S. 584 (1972); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)).
136 See id.
137 Id. at 578.
138 Id.
'39 Id.
140 Alford, supra note 61, at 18.
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Perhaps most interesting about this discussion is that the Roper
Court went much further than necessary by providing a general justifi-
cation of the consideration of international opinion, discussing both
why it is relevant to constitutional interpretation and why considering
it does not offend U.S. sovereignty.1 4' The Court's grand finale,
which asserted that acknowledging international opinion on funda-
mental rights should only strengthen the importance of those rights
in our "heritage of freedom,"1 42 made clear that the Court's use of
international opinion is normative rather than empirical. Thus,
through this statement, the Court seemed to be returning the Eighth
Amendment to its constitutional roots of using international opinion
to gauge what appropriate deference to worldviews requires.' 43
b. International Opinion: A Normative Inquiry
The Court's statements and methodology in both Atkins and
Roper make clear that its use of international opinion when interpret-
ing the Eighth Amendment is normative, meaning that the Court uses
evidence of international norms to indicate what U.S. norms and val-
ues should be, and thus to provide insight when interpreting the U.S.
Constitution. Such normative use of international opinion is consis-
tent with the Court's constitutional interpretation on other fronts. 144
For example, the Court relied in part on international norms in Law-
rence v. Texas to hold that the right to privacy should extend to same-
sex relationships.1 45 In so holding, the Court stated, "The right the
petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of
human freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing
that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing per-
sonal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent."1 46
Additionally, the Court's references to fundamental rights and
freedoms when discussing how international opinion informs consti-
tutional interpretation suggest that this inquiry is a normative one. In
Roper, for example, the Court stated that "the express affirmation of
certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply un-
141 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-79.
142 543 U.S. at 578.
143 See Alford, supra note 61, at 18; Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World
Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1085 (2002).
144 See Neuman, supra note 85, at 89.
145 See 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
146 Id. at 577. Some critics argue that the Court's use of foreign law as indicative of
international opinion in Atkins and Lawrence was flawed in that the Court cited only to laws
that supported its own conclusions. See, e.g., Connell, supra note 59, at 74. A more plausi-
ble interpretation, however, is that the Court used international opinion in those cases in a
normative rather than empirical manner, and as such, it was only necessary for the Court
to look to the laws of nations that share values similar to those of the United States for
normative insights.
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derscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage
of freedom,"'147 thus indicating that it uses international opinion to
determine what fundamental rights the founders of the U.S. Constitu-
tion intended to afford. This normative use of international opinion
evokes the notion Justice Blackmun espoused: Since "a decent respect
for the global opinions of mankind" must inform the Eighth Amend-
ment, the Court's "evolving standards of decency" analysis must em-
body international norms. 148
III
APPLYING THE ROPER-ATKINS "EVOLVING STANDARDS OF
DECENCY" FRAMEWORK TO CAPITAL CHILD-RAPE
STATUTES: BRINGING INTERNATIONAL
OPINION BACK INTO THE ANALYSIS
Once one applies the Roper-Atkins framework to child rape, the
issue becomes whether under evolving standards of decency the death
penalty is so disproportionate for the crime of child rape as to be
"cruel and unusual," and thus unconstitutional. To make this deter-
mination, the Supreme Court would consider national indicia of con-
sensus as evidenced by the acts of state legislatures in enacting capital
child-rape statutes as well as jury practice in utilizing those statutes.
The Court would then consider the proportionality of the death pen-
alty to child rape by analyzing whether child rape falls within the most
serious class of crimes and whether applying the death penalty for
child rape would serve the goals of retribution and deterrence. Lastly,
the Court would consider international opinion on whether the death
penalty is a proportionate penalty for child rape.
A. National Indicia of Consensus on Imposing the Death Penalty
for Child Rape
Strong evidence indicates a national consensus against using the
death penalty for child rape. Indeed, evidence indicates that there is
147 543 U.S. at 578.
148 Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations: Owing a Decent Respect
to the Opinions of Mankind, 88 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 383, 387 (1994). As Justice Black-
mun observed:
Refusing to consider international practice in construing the Eighth
Amendment is convenient for a Court that wishes to avoid conflict between
the death penalty and the Constitution. But it is not consistent with this
Court's established construction of the Eighth Amendment. If the sub-
stance of the Eighth Amendment is to turn on the "evolving standards of
decency" of the civilized world, there can be no justification for limiting
judicial inquiry to the opinions of the United States. Interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment, no less than treaties and statutes, should be informed
by a decent respect for the global opinions of mankind.
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a national consensus against using the death penalty for non-homi-
cide crimes in general. Of the thirty-eight capital states, twenty-five
permit the death penalty only for crimes that result in death; only
thirteen states permit the death penalty for non-homicide crimes. 149
Although there seems to be no bright line demarcating what the
Court would consider a national consensus, 150 the evidence of it here
is stronger than in either Roper or Atkins, as a majority of capital states
opposes the death penalty for non-homicide crimes. Moreover, that
five of the thirteen capital non-homicide states authorize the death
penalty only for what are known as extraordinary crimes, such as trea-
son or espionage, 151 further strengthens the evidence of consensus.
Thus, without even looking specifically at child rape, the Court would
likely find evidence of national consensus for prohibiting the death
penalty for non-homicide crimes altogether.
The evidence of consensus against authorizing the death penalty
for child rape in particular is even stronger than that against authoriz-
ing it for non-homicide crimes generally. Only five states-Florida,
Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, and South Carolina-authorize the
death penalty for child rape, 152 and three of those five place condi-
tions on its use: Florida's statute requires injury, 153 and Oklahoma's
and South Carolina's statutes-both passed in June of 2006-require
repeat offenses before a court may authorize the punishment. 54
Thus, the evidence of a national consensus against imposing the death
penalty for child rape-the overwhelming majority of states in opposi-
tion to the practice, along with the limitations that some of the other
states impose-is far stronger than that in either Atkins or Roper. Be-
cause there is evidence of a national consensus against imposing the
death penalty for child rape using the traditional counting method,
the Court would not need to resort to the modified counting methodol-
ogy adopted in Roper and Atkins, two cases in which the Court could
not have found consensus under the traditional counting method. 55
149 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2004, supra note 5, at 2.
150 It is clear, however, that the Court considers rape of an adult woman outside the
bounds of constitutionality. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
151 See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2004, supra note 5, at 2.
152 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2000); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (1997);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (2005); 2006 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 326 (West); 2006 S.C. Acts
346.
153 SeeFLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2) (a) (West 2000) ("A person 18 years of age or older
who commits sexual battery upon, or in an attempt to commit sexual battery injures the
sexual organs of, a person less than 12 years of age commits a capital felony ... .
154 See 2006 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 326 (West); 2006 S.C. Acts 346.
155 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563-68 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 342 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, although two of the five states with capital child-
rape statutes passed their statutes just months ago,156 these recent en-
actments are insufficient to make a "direction of change" argument
under Roper or Atkins for a national consensus in favor of the death
penalty for child rape.157 Since only a few states had capital child-rape
statutes in the first place, 58 the two recent enactments do not signifi-
cantly alter the national consensus against the practice. In fact, they
may only further demonstrate the existence of a consensus on the is-
sue by highlighting the fact that the rest of the states recognized early
on that executing a defendant for rape in any form is unconstitu-
tional. As Roper explained, "It would be the ultimate in irony if the
very fact that the inappropriateness of the death penalty [for child
rape] was broadly recognized.., were to become a reason to continue
the execution of [child-rape offenders]. ' ' t 5
On the other hand, one could argue that the low number of
states authorizing the death penalty for child rape is not evidence of
consensus but rather of attempted compliance with Coker. In other
words, states without capital child-rape statutes may have failed to en-
act them not because they considered them excessive, but because
they thought doing so would have violated Coker. Upon closer exami-
nation, however, this argument fails because even before Coker, there
was a strong consensus against using the death penalty for child rape.
As the Coker Court pointed out, only two jurisdictions authorized capi-
tal punishment for child rape at the time of the decision. 160
Moreover, four states-Mississippi, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
and California-tried to pass capital child-rape statutes and failed, 161
demonstrating that the idea of imposing the death penalty for child
rape was considered and rejected through the democratic process
rather than to comply with Coker. Had a state merely been complying
with Coker, it would not have attempted to pass the legislation in the
first place. Though one could argue that such attempts also showed
156 2006 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 326 (West); 2006 S.C. Acts 346.
157 But see Meister, supra note 36, at 210-12.
158 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2000); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (1997); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (2005).
159 543 U.S. at 567.
160 433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977) ("It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and
Tennessee also authorized the death penalty in some rape cases, but only where the victim
was a child and the rapist an adult. The Tennessee statute has since been invalidated
because the death sentence was mandatory. The upshot is that Georgia is the' sole jurisdic-
tion in the United States at the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the
rape victim is an adult woman, and only two other jurisdictions provide capital punishment
when the victim is a child." (citation omnitted)).
161 See Meister, supra note 36, at 217. Montana is also included in Meister's discussion
of states that have failed to pass capital child-rape statutes, see id., but since the publication
of the note, the state has since enacted such a law, § 45-5-503.
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an increased interest in capital child-rape statutes, 16 2 the ultimate in-
validation of such proposals is more probative as evidence of consen-
sus against such laws.
In addition to state statutes, jury practice further indicates a na-
tional consensus against imposing the death penalty for child rape.
For example, Louisiana prosecutors had sought the death penalty
against several different defendants under the state's capital child-
rape statute for ten years, but until Kennedy, juries had consistently
failed to return a death sentence. t 63
B. Proportionality of the Death Penalty as a Punishment for
Child Rape
The death penalty is an unconstitutional punishment for child
rape because it is not among the "narrow category of the most serious
crimes"; thus, imposing the death penalty does not proportionately
serve the goal of retribution. 164 Commentators argue that both Coker
and Enmund require that a crime cause death in order for the death
penalty to be a proportionate punishment. 165 As such, child rape falls
outside the class of "worst crimes" because it does not in result in
death, 166 and in light of this disproportionality, the retribution goal
would be overserved by the punishment of death for child rape.
Arguments to the contrary are not wholly without merit, however.
For example, some argue that since rape of a child is a more heinous
crime than rape of an adult, the impacts both on the victim and on
society warrant a more severe penalty. 167 Others argue that since
there is increasing acknowledgement of rape, and particularly child
rape, as a societal problem, harsher sanctions for it are also likely to
be accepted.' 68 One could argue that recently enacted laws-such as
Megan's Laws, 169 new Federal Rules of Evidence that make a special
exception to admit propensity evidence against convicted children
molesters, 170 and an arguable increase in capital non-homicide stat-
utes-reflect both the recognition of child rape as a problem as well
162 See Meister, supra note 36, at 217.
163 See Liptak, supra note 1.
164 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 319 (2002)).
165 See Matura, supra note 1, at 262; Schaaf, supra note 18, at 353-60.
166 See Diamond, supra note 54, at 1177-81.
167 See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 32, at 79, 85-90, 99-105; Palmer, supra note 31, at 834.
168 See, e.g., Meister, supra note 36, at 210-16.
169 Megan's Laws, named for the New Jersey statute passed following the rape and
murder of seven-year-old Megan Kankar by a convicted sex offender, N.J. STAT ANN. § 2C:7-
1 (West 2005), require convicted sex offenders to register with their states and local com-
munities when they move.
170 FED. R. EviD. 414.
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as the receptivity toward more severe sanctions for it.' 7' While these
arguments are not without force, they do not justify applying the
death penalty to child rape offenders, as legislatures have significant
leeway to impose harsher sanctions for child rape without having to
resort to capital punishment.
In addition to its disproportionality and its failure to proportion-
ately serve the retribution goal, authorizing the death penalty for
child rape does not serve the deterrence function of the U.S. penal
system. In fact, several factors suggest that the practice would actually
inhibit the deterrence function. Imposing the death penalty for child
rape, a punishment as severe as that for murder, actually removes a
major incentive for rapists not to kill their victims. 172 Not only would
rapists have "nothing to lose" by killing their victims in the sense that
they would face no greater punishment for doing so, but they may also
actually have something to gain from killing their victims-eliminat-
ing the only witnesses to their crimes. 173 Furthermore, since acquaint-
ances and relatives are often the perpetrators of child rape, making
child rape a capital crime may inhibit the reporting of offenses, thus
further hampering the deterrence function, as victims and their par-
ents may be less likely to come forward when the punishment for the
offender may be death. 174 Therefore, although children are a pro-
tected class, 175 and the policy interests in protecting them from rape
and the physical, mental, and social trauma that comes with it may be
more compelling than for adults, 176 imposing the death penalty for
child rape could actually place children in more danger than ever
before. As such, the death penalty for child rape is not the best way to
satisfy these policy interests. 177
C. International Opinion on Imposing the Death Penalty for
Child Rape
The rapidly growing trend toward abolishing the death penalty
worldwide1 78 should also encourage the Supreme Court to find the
capital child-rape statutes unconstitutional and to limit the class of
capital crimes in the United States to those crimes that cause death.
One hundred twenty-nine countries have abolished the death penalty
171 See id.
172 See Glazer, supra note 32, at 105-07.
173 See id.
174 See Glazer, supra note 32, at 111; Diamond, supra note 54, at 1185-89.
175 See Meister, supra note 36, at 209-10.
176 See id. at 208-10.
177 See Diamond, supra note 54, at 1185-89 (arguing that since capital child-rape stat-
utes put children in more danger than they would be in otherwise, a state would be violat-
ing its duty to protect children if it were to enact such a law).
178 See AMNES'TY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 83; William A. Schabas, International Law
and Abolition of the Death Penalty: Recent Developments, 4 ILSAJ. INT'L & CoMp. L. 535 (1998).
2006]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
in law or practice. 79 Sixty-eight others retain it, but the number of
nations that use the death penalty regularly is much smaller.'80 In
2005, four countries, including the United States, were responsible for
94 percent of all known executions around the world.18' The rate of
abolition of the death penalty is also very high. In the past sixteen
years alone, over forty countries have abolished the death penalty for
all crimes. 82 There are also several international agreements to abol-
ish the death penalty, including four international treaties whereby
nations have committed themselves against the practice.183
International norms regarding the death penalty specifically for
child rape must also inform the Court's analysis, however. Countries
that authorize the death penalty specifically for child rape include
China, Iran, Jordan, Mongolia, the Philippines, Uganda, and Uzbeki-
stan. 18 4 But some of those countries also authorize the death penalty
for adult rape,18 5 a punishment that the Supreme Court held uncon-
stitutional in Coker.1 86
Furthermore, more than half of the countries that retain the
death penalty do not have capital child-rape laws. As such, given that
the Court's use of international opinion is normative rather than em-
pirical, it should, and likely will, consider international opinion as a
limiting factor on the use of the death penalty for child rape. Though
this does not mean that the United States will abolish the death pen-
alty entirely, it certainly means that considering international opinion
may encourage the United States to limit its use of the death penalty
to a narrow definition of the most severe crimes.18 7 If international
opinion factors into the Court's analysis at all, it would be difficult to
justify any expansion of the class of capital crimes in the United States
or any weakening of the definition of "serious" when much of the rest
of the world is abolishing the death penalty altogether.
Not only will the Court likely use international opinion to limit
the class of capital crimes, but it will also likely use it to speak to what
evolving standards of decency require.' 88 "The real question is
whether the United States death penalty system is consistent with
twentieth century international moral standards, consistent with en-
179 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 83.
180 See id.
181 See id. The other three countries are all illiberal, authoritarian states: China, Iran,
and Saudi Arabia. See id.
182 See id.
183 See id.
184 See ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALT" 84-85 (3d ed. 2002).
185 See id. at 83-84, 86.
186 See 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
187 Cf Schabas, supra note 178, at 535 ("International lawmakers urged the limitation
of the death penalty ... by restricting it to an ever-shrinking list of serious crimes.").
188 See Alford, supra note 61, at 18.
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lightened world public opinion, and consistent with recent interna-
tional legal pronouncements and decisions."' 8 9 The Court's analysis
in Roper and Atkins, which spoke of the U.S. "heritage of freedom"
based on rights we share with other nations and peoples,19 1 indicates
that the Court may agree with such a statement. This broader view
should compel the Court to strike down laws expanding the number
of capital crimes and limit the class only to those that cause death.
CONCLUSION
Even without looking to international opinion, capital child-rape
statutes are clearly unconstitutional. First, there is a strong national
consensus against imposing the death penalty for child rape. In addi-
tion, the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for the
crime of rape, regardless of the age of the victim, because it does not
cause death. Moreover, imposing the death penalty for child rape
would fail to serve, and would likely inhibit, the retribution and deter-
rence functions of the U.S. penal system.
Looking at international opinion, however, gives the Court even
more reason to invalidate capital child-rape statutes, as the worldwide
movement to abolish the death penalty makes narrowing the class of
capital crimes even more urgent. The United States stands alone in its
death penalty jurisprudence in that, unlike many of its peer countries,
it has not yet abolished the practice, and even as compared with other
retentionist countries, it uses the death penalty with much greater fre-
quency. If the United States is to continue as a leader among its
peers, evolving standards of decency must incorporate the norms of
foreign nations-not just those of the United States. As Justice Black-
mun asserted, "Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, no less than
treaties and statutes, should be informed by a decent respect for the
global opinions of mankind."'191
189 Warren Allmand et al., Human Rights and Human Wrongs: Is the United States Death
Penalty System Inconsistent with International Human Rights Law?, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2793,
2817 (1999).
190 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
191 Blackmun, supra note 148, at 387.
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